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“Out, Damned [Metadata]!”
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By Emily Shaw 
 
I. Introduction 
 
We live in exciting times; technology is evolving quickly.  The legal profession, however, 
has a history of begrudging and delayed acceptance of new technology.   Attorneys may be 
slow to learn new tricks, but when it comes to metadata, the usual reactionary behavior could 
be harmful to clients.  It is imperative that attorneys understand the ethical and evidentiary 
issues that arise when metadata is disclosed, mishandled, discovered, or destroyed.  This paper 
explores these issues and recommends best practices to avoid inadvertent disclosures and 
ethical violations.  The structure of this paper is as follows:  first, metadata is defined and 
explained.  Second, I will explain potential harm that metadata can cause.  Third, issues of 
confidentiality, attorney-client privilege will be explored.  Fourth, I will explore some of the 
evidentiary concerns regarding discovery and destruction of metadata.  Finally, the conclusion 
will recommend best practices for new and experienced attorneys to avoid metadata missteps 
and manage metadata with confidence. 
 
II. Metadata Defined 
 
Definitions vary with context and jurisdiction, but simply put, metadata is data about 
data.  In the legal context, metadata is “all of the contextual, processing, and use information” 
associated with an electronic document.2  John Kinas, director of information technology for 
the District of Columbia Bar, likened metadata to a price tag on a wedding gift—it’s a very 
useful piece of information when you’re buying the gift, but it becomes problematic if you 
accidentally leave it on.3  Metadata is useful and necessary for common computer applications.  
For example, the ability to ‘undo’ an edit in a Microsoft Word document relies on metadata 
that tracks the edit history of the document.4  Attorneys may be uncomfortable, to say the 
least, if their opposing counsel were able to click ‘undo’ to see the edit history of their client’s 
document.  The metadata in a typical Microsoft Word document may include: the author’s 
name and initials, the name of the company or organization where the document was created, 
the names of previous document authors, the original text and any revisions, template 
information, digital comments, document versions, and hidden text.5 
 
A competent attorney must understand how courts view metadata.  The Southern 
District of New York defines metadata as “electronically-stored evidence that describes the 
‘history, tracking, or management of an electronic document.’”6  The courts have recognized 
several distinct types of electronic metadata, including substantive metadata, system metadata, 
and embedded metadata.7  Substantive metadata (sometimes referred to as “application” 
metadata) is created as a function of the application software used to create the document or 
file.8  This includes information that instructs the computer how to properly display properties 
of a document such as the fonts, spacing, size, and color, as well as information that reflects 
modifications to the document, such as its edit history.9  This information transfers with the 
document because it is embedded in the file when it is moved or copied.10  A second category 
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of metadata is system metadata.  System metadata “reflects information created by the user or 
by the organization’s information management system.”11  This type of metadata is particularly 
helpful when attempting to search and sort large numbers of documents efficiently—both in 
the context of regular use and in e-discovery.12  A third category of metadata is embedded 
metadata.13  Embedded metadata consists of “text, numbers, content, data, or other 
information that is directly or indirectly imputed into a [n]ative [f]ile by a user and which is not 
typically visible to the user viewing the output display” of the native file.14  This type of 
metadata includes spreadsheet formulas, hidden columns, hyperlinks, references, and database 
information.15  With this basic understanding of what metadata is, an attorney is prepared to 
confront issues that may arise with its intentional or unintentional disclosure or discovery. 
 
III. Potential Pitfalls 
 
Metadata is useful in document production.  It was originally developed “by software 
programmers accustomed to working in collaborative environments where sharing information 
is commonplace.”16  Law firms also benefit from collaboration; in fact, Microsoft revealed in a 
2001 press release that it solicited opinions from attorneys in developing Word 2002 because 
“the legal profession must have an efficient way to compare documents and incorporate text 
and formatting changes.”17  However, as much as the legal profession benefits from 
collaboration, it stands to lose a lot if that information falls into the wrong hands.   
 
Examples of metadata mishaps range from embarrassing to catastrophic.  In February 
2003, British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s office published a dossier on Iraq’s security and 
intelligence organizations; this dossier was cited by Colin Powell in his address to the United 
Nations.18  This dossier was published as a Microsoft Word document.19  The metadata from 
the Word document revealed that, contrary to the government’s assertions, it had been drafted 
by civilians and that parts of it had been plagiarized from a thesis written more than ten years 
previously.20   
 
 Portable Document Format (PDF) files have less metadata and are frequently regarded 
as safer from metadata mining than other file formats.  While this is often the case, PDFs are 
not foolproof.  Attorneys at Facebook learned this lesson the hard way.  In 2009, large portions 
of the transcript of the settlement between Facebook and ConnectU were redacted and a PDF 
of the transcript was made publicly available.21  While the image of the PDF had blacked-out 
the redacted portions of the PDF, the metadata that provides the searchable text in a PDF was 
not altered.22  Thus, members of the Associated Press were able to simply copy and paste the 
sensitive information from the PDF.23  The metadata revealed that Facebook’s internal 
valuation of the company was $3.7 billion, $8.88 per share.24  This was far less than the $15 
billion valuation established by the Microsoft investment in 2007.25 
 
 While disclosing settlement terms is highly embarrassing (and likely a breach of a 
confidentiality clause), active litigants have even more at stake.  In 2004, the SCO group, an 
entity that licenses and sells Unix, filed a complaint in state court against DaimlerChrysler and 
AutoZone.26  The metadata gleaned from the court-filed documents revealed that SCO group’s 
3 
 
attorneys had been building a case against Bank of America in federal court.27  In fact, the Word 
document, when viewed under the “original showing markup” setting, identified Bank of 
America as a defendant until exactly 11:10 a.m. on February 18.28 
 
 These examples have a few things in common.  Each metadata leak was exposed by 
members of the press who had no duty not to disclose this publicly shared information.  Each 
leak was found using rudimentary computer functions—Microsoft Word document settings and 
copy-paste commands.  Each metadata leak caused a scandal.  But most importantly, each 
metadata leak could have been prevented using basic metadata scrubbing procedures. 
 
IV. Ethical Issues 
 
The attorneys from the examples in section III clearly did not intend to leak confidential 
information through metadata, but these situations nevertheless raise various ethical issues.  
First, the disclosure may amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.  Second, the 
disclosure may amount to a waiver of work product protection.  Third, while the above 
examples of metadata leaks were all exposed by third parties, it is important to note that 
opposing counsel that read inadvertently disclosed metadata may themselves be committing an 
ethical violation.  
 
The attorney-client privilege is among the oldest and most fundamental protections in 
the American justice system.29  This privilege protects communication between attorneys and 
clients in order to encourage full and frank communication between clients and their attorneys 
and thus “promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of 
justice.”30  The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines the test of qualifying 
attorney-client communications as four elements: “(1) a communication (2) made between 
privileged persons (3) in confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal 
assistance for the client.”31  It is well-settled law that this privilege belongs solely to the client.32  
However, courts acknowledge that “the attorney’s conduct may bind the client even in the 
absence of his express consent” if the attorney is acting under the authority granted to her as 
agent.33  Implied waiver may occur when a client voluntarily discloses confidential 
communications to a non-essential third party.34  Courts split into three distinct approaches 
when it comes to determining whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived through 
inadvertent disclosure. 
 
The “Strict Approach” holds that inadvertent disclosure always waives the attorney-
client privilege.  This approach, sometimes called the “Wigmorian approach”, the “strict-liability 
approach”, or the “objective approach,” follows the teachings of Professor Wigmore, who 
believed that all disclosures “are not protected by the privilege, on the principle that, since the 
law has granted secrecy so far as its own process goes, it leaves it to the client and attorney to 
take measures of caution sufficient to prevent [disclosure]. The risk of insufficient precautions is 
upon the client.”35  The D.C. Circuit is among the courts that follow this approach.36  Proponents 
of this approach believe that a uniform application to the waiver will prevent abuse of the duty 
of confidentiality and encourage attorneys to take effective measures to prevent inadvertent 
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disclosures.37  Conversely, critics say that this approach is unduly harsh and intrudes upon the 
attorney-client relationship because it may discourage clients from confiding in their attorney.38  
Furthermore, the Wigmorian view was devised in an age before liberal discovery practices and 
may be an impractical approach to today’s high-volume document disclosures. 
 
The “Lenient Approach” (also referred to as the intent-based approach) requires intent 
to disclose privileged material and fully protects from inadvertent disclosure.39  Courts that 
follow this approach, including Federal courts in Florida and Illinois, reason that since waiver is 
often defined as “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a 
legal right or advantage,”40 it is not possible to waive the privilege inadvertently.41  Proponents 
of this approach argue that this rule protects clients from their attorneys’ negligence.  This 
reflects the concept that the privilege belongs solely to the client.  Like the Strict Approach, this 
approach also has the benefits of a uniform application and easy administration.42  However, 
critics of the Lenient Approach argue that this approach ignores the basic principles of agency 
law and leaves little incentive for attorneys to guard privileged information.43 
 
The third and most common approach, adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, is the 
Circumstances Approach—which, predictably, finds a middle ground between the Strict 
Approach and the Lenient Approach.44  Courts that follow this approach examine all of the 
circumstances surrounding the inadvertent disclosure and allow waiver in only limited 
circumstances, such as when an attorney or client “fail[s] to take reasonable steps to maintain 
confidentiality.”45  Courts examine five factors to determine if the privilege is waived: “(1) the 
reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure in view of the extent 
of the document production; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the 
disclosure; (4) the promptness of measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) whether the 
overriding interests of justice would or would not be served by relieving the party of its 
error.”46  Unsurprisingly, the gains in flexibility and fairness by adopting this approach cost 
some efficiency and predictability that go along with the uniform approaches.  The bottom line 
for an attorney in entrusted with confidential client information is to know your jurisdiction and 
act reasonably and competently. 
 
The work product doctrine, codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),47 
provides “qualified immunity for materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party, an 
attorney, or some other representative of a party.”48  When confronted with the issue of work 
product protection, nearly all jurisdictions follow a similar approach to the Circumstances 
Approach from the Attorney-Client Privilege jurisprudence.49  Courts weigh the following five 
factors to determine whether a waiver has occurred: “(1) reasonableness of precautions taken 
to prevent disclosure, (2) time taken to rectify error, (3) scope of discovery, (4) extent of 
disclosure, and (5) overriding issues of fairness.”50 
 
An attorney who receives inadvertently disclosed privileged information is faced with 
conflicting ethical obligations: they have both a duty to diligently represent their client and a 
duty to avoid dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.51 This dilemma was addressed in 
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2002 by the Model Rule 4.4(b), which directs the receiving attorney to promptly notify the 
sender.52 
 
V. Evidentiary Issues 
 
Metadata is an unsettled frontier in e-discovery and full treatment of the subject is well 
beyond the scope of this paper.  Nonetheless, attorneys must understand the rules, or they risk 
sanctions for evidence spoliation or even criminal charges for destruction of evidence.53  The 
watershed case on the subject, Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., held that a 
defendant who produces electronic files during discovery must also produce their 
corresponding metadata.54  Three years after Williams, the Southern District of New York 
clarified some of the requirements for various types of metadata production in e-discovery.55 
Substantive metadata, which includes information such as prior edit history, editorial 
comments, and computer display instructions, “need not be routinely produced” unless the 
requesting party shows good cause.56  System metadata, such as information about the author, 
date of creation, and date of modification are frequently considered irrelevant by courts.57  
System metadata may be relevant, however, if the authenticity of a document is questioned or 
dates of document creation are important to the case.58  Embedded metadata, such as 
formulae in complicated spreadsheets, is “generally discoverable” and “should be produced as 
a matter of course.”59  Importantly, the destruction of metadata can land a client and attorney 
in trouble for spoliation of evidence.60   
 
VI. Conclusion and Best Practices 
 
As professionals entrusted with privileged client information and sophisticated data 
management responsibilities, it is imperative that new and experienced attorneys alike become 
familiar with the dangers of inadvertent metadata disclosure and evidence spoliation from the 
irresponsible destruction of metadata.  This is a fine line that attorneys must walk.  The most 
important thing to remember is that the moment a client is on notice of the pending litigation, 
metadata must be preserved with their corresponding electronic documents.61  At no point, 
however, should an attorney ever send a document with work product metadata.  The best 
practice is to use metadata scrubbing software to ensure that outgoing documents and files 
that are sent to opposing counsel, third parties, or e-filed with a court are sent without 
potentially damaging metadata.  Large firms typically have this kind of software integrated into 
their data management systems.  Small firms and solo practitioners can purchase relatively 
inexpensive software programs that will remove metadata from outgoing documents and files.  
These software programs are extremely effective and are part of a responsible and reasonable 
effort to protect privileged information from inadvertent disclosure.  In closing, all attorneys 
would be wise to heed John Kinas’s [and Lady Macbeth’s paraphrased] advice: “Scrub early, and 
scrub often.”62 
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